Kant on the ethical community and the pursuit of happiness by Müftügil, Onur Fevzi & Muftugil, Onur Fevzi
    
  
 
KANT ON THE ETHICAL COMMUNITY AND THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS 
   
                                                                                                                                                                    
                                                                                                                                               
 
                                                               
                 
 
                by 
 
            ONUR FEVZİ MÜFTÜGİL 
 
 
 
Submitted to the Graduate School of Arts and Social Sciences  
in partial fulfillment of the  
                     requirements for the degree of  
                                                        Master of Arts  
 
         
 
  
 
      Sabancı University 
                        SPRING 2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
KANT ON THE ETHICAL COMMUNITY AND THE PURSUIT OF   
 
                               HAPPINESS 
 
 
 
 
APPROVED BY: 
 
 
 
Assistant  Prof. Dr. Nedim Nomer               …………………………. 
(Thesis  Supervisor) 
 
                        Assistant Prof. Dr. Ayhan Akman              ………………………… 
 
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Ahmet Öncü                      …………………………. 
 
 
 
DATE OF APPROVAL:  …………………………. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© Onur Fevzi Müftügil 
 
All Rights Reserved 
 
 
    
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             iv 
 
 
 
 
 
     ABSTRACT 
         KANT ON THE ETHICAL COMMUNITY AND THE PURSUIT OF         
          HAPPINESS 
           
ONUR FEVZİ MÜFTÜGİL 
   Political Science, M.A Thesis, 2006 
   Assistant Prof. Dr. Nedim Nomer 
Keywords: Kant, kingdom of ends, highest good, God, ethical community 
 
 
 
         This thesis aims to refute the formalist interpretation of Kant’s ethics according to 
which all that it takes to be virtuous is to do one’s duty for the sake of duty with no regard 
to one’s happiness. In contrary, this thesis claims that for Kant, we have a duty to promote 
general happiness and its distribution in proportion to virtue-“the highest good”. In other 
words, we should adopt a beneficent will and promote the happiness of all. To be able to 
perform this command of morality, Kant thinks that we need to establish an ethical 
community. This is because a morally corrupt community feeds our desire to affirm our 
superiority over others making us too preoccupied with distinctions in terms of wealth, 
knowledge and status to recognize the importance of and our capacity for virtue. A further 
argument of this thesis is that the ethical community has a religious nature and appeals to 
our need for the possibility of God’s existence as well as to the morally useful 
psychologically compelling effect of belief in God. Kant thinks that by uniting in such an 
“ethical community”, we can create a moral kingdom (a kingdom of ends) in which the 
pursuit of one member’s happiness harmonizes with and advances the pursuit of another 
member’s happiness. 
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               ÖZET 
                      KANT FELSEFESİNDE AHLAKİ CEMAAT VE MUTLULUK  
                                ONUR FEVZİ MÜFTÜGİL, Yüksek Lisans Tezi, 2006 
     Yard. Doç. Dr. Nedim Nomer 
Anahtar sözcükler: Kant, amaçlar krallığı, en yüksek iyilik, Tanrı, ahlaki cemaat 
 
      
         Bu tezin amacı Kant ahlakının formalist(içeriksiz) yorumunu çürütmektir. 
Kant ahlakının formalist(içeriksiz) yorumuna göre erdemli olmak için tek 
yapmamız gereken görevimizi mutluluğumuzu düşünmeksizin sadece görev 
bilinci ile yerine getirmektir. Bu tez bu yoruma şu şekilde karşı çıkmaktadır. 
Kant’a göre erdemli olmak için aynı zamanda herkesin mutlu olabileceği bir 
durumu yaratmak ve bu genel mutluluktan hak ettiğimiz payı almak, yani “en 
yüksek iyiliği” oluşturmak gerekmektedir. Ne kadar hak ettiğimiz ise 
erdemliliğimiz ile doğru orantılıdır. Bu tezde savunulan bir diğer sav da Kant’a 
göre bu ahlaki gerekliliği yerine getirmek için “ahlaki bir cemaat” kurmamızın bir 
şart olduğudur. Çünkü ahlaken yoz bir cemaat başkalarına üstünlük taslama 
arzumuzu körükleyerek bizi erdemli olabilme yetimizden ve erdemin öneminden 
uzaklaştırmakta ve kafamızı daha çok zenginlik,statü ve bilgi temelindeki 
toplumsal farklılıklar ile meşgul etmektedir. Bununla beraber, Kant’a göre ahlaki 
bir cemaat ayni zamanda dini bir cemaattir ve bizim Tanrı’nın varlığının mümkün 
olması fikrine ihtiyacımıza ve psikolojimizde yaptığı etki ile bizi erdemli olmaya 
yönlendiren Tanrı inancına  hitap etmektedir. Kant’a göre böyle bir cemaat 
oluşturarak, bir bireyin mutlu olma çabasının bir diğerinin mutlu olma çabası ile 
uyum içinde olduğu ve o çabanın gelişimine ve başarısına yardımcı olduğu ahlaki 
bir alan(“bir amaçlar krallığı”) yaratabiliriz. 
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    CHAPTER 1: 
    INTRODUCTION 
  
         Kant’s ethical theory is frequently portrayed as an empty formalism. It is 
generally thought that according to Kant morality is formal observance of the 
moral law- simply doing one’s duty for the sake of duty. In this view, Kantian 
ethics is regarded as oblivious to human fulfillment (happiness) and perfection1. 
This is a great injustice to the richness of Kant’s ethics which is unquestionably 
concerned with how a happy and (morally) perfect humanity can be brought about. 
         The first step in my critique of the formalist interpretation of Kant is to see 
the relationship between Kant’s different formulations of the moral law. Kant 
discusses three formulations: 
 
(1) “Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time 
will that it should become a universal law” (Ak 4:421) 
(2) “Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person 
or in the person of another, always at the same time as an end and never 
simply as a means” (Ak 4:429) 
(3)“ A rational being belongs to the “kingdom of ends” as a member when 
he legislates in it universal laws while also being himself subject to these 
laws”(Ak 4:433)2 
                                                
1
  For an example of this classical approach, see J.B. Schneewind,” Autonomy, 
Obligation and Virtue: An Overview of Kant’s Moral Philosophy,” in Paul Guyer, ed., 
The Cambridge Companion to Kant( Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p 
309-41  
 
2
 Throughout, I used the pagination of the Akademie Edition which is abbreviated as 
AK: Akademie der wissenschaften (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1902-)  For Critique of 
Pure Reason, I did not use the Akademie Edition. Citations to this work use the 
abbreviation KA and KB: Critique of Pure Reason Part A and Critique of Pure Reason 
Part B. Please see the footnotes and the bibliography for the English translations I used 
for Kant’s works.  
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         It is clear from the second formulation (2) that Kant sees moral action to be 
directly connected with the promotion of an end (a purpose) Moral action has to 
promote the end of humanity. Humanity should always be treated as an absolute 
end and never as means. When we refuse to regard someone merely as a means to 
the satisfaction of our desires and interests, we are recognizing the humanity in 
him and promoting the end of humanity.    
         The “kingdom of ends” in the third formulation (3) means a kingdom in 
which all rational beings pursue their ends in harmony. It is “a whole of all ends in 
systematic connection” (Ak 433)   In other words, the ends pursued by the 
members of the kingdom of ends harmonize with each other. This is because only 
the ends whose pursuit is morally permissible can be pursued in the kingdom of 
ends.  The end of humanity (2) is the primary end that we should pursue in the 
kingdom of ends. That is, once again, we should always treat humanity in others 
and ourselves as an end in itself and never merely as means. 
         And the first formulation (1) tells us which other ends can be morally 
pursued in the kingdom of ends. We should be able to will that the ends we pursue 
are pursuable by all rational beings. Thus, we should act on the maxims that can 
become universal laws (laws for all rational beings)3.  The ends commanded by 
maxims that cannot be universalized have no place in the “kingdom of ends”.   
         If my interpretation is correct, then the “kingdom of ends”, though it is a 
hypothetical concept4, becomes a central concept in Kant’s moral thought. It both 
includes both the pursuit of the end of humanity (2) and the principle of the 
universabilizity of maxims (1), a principle that tells us which other ends can be 
pursued in the “kingdom of ends”.  
         Now, in the “kingdom of ends” there are certain ends the pursuit of which is 
a duty- what Kant calls a“duty of virtue” (Ak 6:383).  These ends are “one’s own 
perfection” (Ak 6:387) and the “happiness of others” (Ak 6:388) The duty to 
strive for one’s own perfection consists in “cultivating one’s faculties... the highest 
                                                
3
 A maxim is a subjective principle of action. As we always act in order to attain certain 
ends, a maxim always states an end of action. When we act on maxims that can become 
universal laws we ensure that the ends we pursue can be pursued by other rational 
beings. 
4
 No such kingdom really exists in the world. 
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of which is understanding... [and] cultivation of one’s will(moral cast of mind)” 
(Ak 6:387) Duty to make the happiness of others one’s end is to contribute to their 
happiness by helping them realize their ends. Kant notes, however, that ”it is for 
them to decide what they count as belonging to their happiness; but it is open to 
me to refuse them many things that they think will make them happy but that I do 
not”(Ak 6:388) A further note is that in carrying out the duty to make the 
happiness of others one’ end, Kant allows only for the morally permissible pursuit 
of happiness(Ak 4:405) This is not surprising because the duty to make the 
happiness of others one’s end is itself a command of morality. Morality would be 
in contradiction with itself if it had allowed for a morally unacceptable promotion 
of the happiness of others. 
                  It is very clear that Kantian ethics is primarily concerned with human 
perfection and happiness5. These are two ends to pursue which is a duty 
incumbent upon the members of the “kingdom of ends”. The duty to promote the 
happiness of other people6 requires “an unselfish will which extends itself beyond 
the formal observance of the formal law to the production of an object (highest 
good)” (KA 279-80) The highest good is morally permissible happiness of all. It is 
“universal happiness proportioned to universal virtue” (Ak129) It is a state in 
which happiness is distributed according to virtue. In the highest good, therefore, 
the ends of (moral) perfection and general happiness are simultaneously realized. 
To achieve this state is the object of morality. According to Kant, in other words, 
morality goes “beyond the formal observance of the formal law” and aims at 
bringing about the general happiness. The moral realm (the kingdom of ends) is, 
therefore, a necessary condition of the highest good. In fact, Kant sometimes 
identifies the moral realm with the highest good(KA 809, KB837) This further 
establishes that formalism is not an accurate description of Kant’s ethical thought 
and that for Kant morality is closely connected with the establishment and proper 
distribution of general happiness. 
                                                
5
 The following interpretations of Kant’s moral thought are informed about this. See 
Allen Wood, Kant’s Ethical Thought(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1999), 
Roger J. Sullivan, An Introduction to Kant’s Ethics( Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press,1994), Barbara Herman, The Practice of Moral Judgment(Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press,1996), Philip Stratton-Lake,  Kant, Duty and Moral Worth, Routledge 
Studies in Ethics and Moral Theory(Routledge: London,2000) 
 
6
 Promoting one’s own happiness cannot be a duty because it is a natural inclination. 
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         One other misportrait of Kant’s ethics is to underestimate its religious 
backbone7. This stems from a lack of emphasis on Kant’s work, “Religion Within 
the Boundaries of Pure Reason”. In this work, Kant implies that the “kingdom of 
ends” finds its concrete manifestation “in the founding of a Kingdom of God on 
earth”(Ak 6:95)  
         Kant is very clear that possibility of the highest good (general happiness in 
proportion to virtue) requires the postulate of the existence of God. Kant puts this 
in the following way: 
 
“In the moral law, there is not the least ground for a necessary connection 
between virtue and the happiness proportionate to it... But since we should 
seek to advance the highest good (which must therefore also be possible) we 
must postulate a ground of this connection. The highest good in the world is 
only possible insofar as a supreme cause of nature is assumed, which has 
causality appropriate to a moral disposition and which can only be God. 
Consequently the postulate of the possibility of the highest derived good(the 
best world) is at the same time the postulate of the actuality of a highest 
original good, namely the existence of God... the possibility of the highest 
good... occurs only under the condition of the existence of God”(Ak 5:124-
25) 
  
Only God can connect virtue and happiness proportionate to it (which are not 
connected through the moral law) by meddling in human affairs and assigning 
happiness according to virtue. We must, therefore, postulate the existence of God 
to be able to promote the highest good: “since we should seek to advance the 
highest good (which must therefore also be possible) we must postulate the ground 
of the connection between virtue and happiness in proportion to virtue” (AK 
5:124-125).  
                                                
 
7
 Kant’s claim that as a postulate of practical reason God is necessary for a complete 
system of morality is generally recognized. Still, as Allen Wood accurately observes, 
the basic misinterpretation to treat religion as incidental to Kant’s rational morality 
persists.(See Allen Wood, “ Religion, Ethical Community and the Struggle Against 
Evil”, unpublished essay available online at 
http://www.stanford.edu/~allenw/webpapers/EthicalCommunity.doc ,pp3) Christine 
Korsgaard, for example, says that,” Faith springs from a need of the moral disposition 
and as such is voluntary. Salvation depends on moral character, not on what one 
believes”. I will argue that what one believes is not as insignificant as Korsgaard takes it 
to be. The psychologically compelling force of belief makes us adhere to the moral law 
strongly. 
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We can now see why Kant associates the kingdom of ends with the kingdom 
of God. Kant has the following argument in mind: 
1. The kingdom of ends (the moral realm) is what constitutes the highest 
good (KA 279-80). 
2. The highest good requires the postulate of the existence of God (Ak 
5:124-5).  
3. The kingdom of ends is therefore a kingdom of God(Ak 6:95). 
           
 
         Kant posits God to make logical sense of a kingdom of ends. This does not 
mean that we need to have a belief in God to be members of the kingdom of ends. 
Kant says that we cannot prove God’s existence but can only know for sure the 
logical possibility of the idea of God(Ak 28:1016) And this is all we need. Kant 
explains this in the following way:      
  
“No assertoric knowledge (even of God’s existence) is required, [but] only 
a problematic assumption (hypothesis) as regards speculation about the 
supreme cause of things: faith needs merely the idea of God... only the 
minimum cognition (it is possible that there is a God) has to be objectively 
sufficient” (Ak 6: 153-154)  
  
All we need to do is to be aware that it is possible that there is a God.  If it were 
known that there is no God, the highest good would be impossible and the duty to 
promote the highest good would be nonsense. The possibility of God’s existence 
makes it impossible to rationally shun the duty to promote the highest good. The 
minimum cognition that God’s existence is possible is therefore all that we need 
from a moral point of view. 
         Still, Kant thinks that belief in God is helpful for morality from a 
psychological point of view. That is, our obedience to the moral law is 
strengthened if we believe in God’s existence. Kant thinks that an atheist’s effort 
for morality is always limited. The atheist will eventually tend to “give up as 
impossible” the struggle for virtue after the realization that virtue does not make 
him happy and there is no God to meddle in human affairs and fix this problem by 
making the virtuous happy(Ak 5:452-3).  
         Does Kant’s claim that the kingdom of ends is the kingdom of God on     
earth (Ak 6:95) contradict Kant’s principle of autonomy of will?  In the “kingdom  
of ends”, each member has to legislate universal laws and be subject to these laws.  
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This is in line with the principle of autonomy- the supreme principle of morality. 
According to this principle, “the will is a law to itself” (Ak 4:440) An autonomous 
will obeys no other law than he has legislated for himself and other rational 
beings. The autonomy of will is the key idea behind human dignity. We are 
intrinsically worthy and end in ourselves because we have the capacity for self-
legislation (autonomy). Autonomy is “what determines the incomparable worth” 
of humanity (Ak 4:436) If the laws of “the kingdom of ends” are self-made (and 
hence man-made) in line with the principle of autonomy, how can Kant find a 
room for God in the kingdom of ends? This is a challenge that any religious 
interpretation of Kant’s ethics has to meet.  
         I think that this challenge can be met by invoking Kant’s immanent 
conception of God. While not denying a transcendental conception of God 
according to which God is above his creation, Kant also talks about an immanent 
conception of God- God as the source of the “good will within the (noumenal) 
self”8. We cannot grasp God in His transcendence but we can represent God to 
ourselves as our good will and develop a rational belief out of that representation. 
That is, we partake in the goodness of God when we develop a good will. When 
God is described in such an immanent way, the principle of autonomy is not 
compromised. We still obey self-made laws to develop a good will and be a 
member of the kingdom of ends but in doing so we partake in the goodness of 
God.     
         Another misinterpretation of Kant’s ethics displays itself in the lack of 
emphasis on the idea of cooperation of individuals in their fight against evil. It is 
usually thought that the creation of a moral realm is a task of individuals in 
isolation. Take for example the following point expressed by Rom Harre: “ Kant’s 
kingdom of ends generated universal moral laws, but only in so far as they applied 
to all individuals, taken one by one. The idea of the moral constraints on a 
predominantly social being played no part”9  This individualistic reading of Kant 
is quite mistaken. This is because well-disposed individuals have to unite in an 
ethical community(Ak 6:94) to bring about a moral realm(kingdom of ends) and 
                                                
8
 Kant’s Opus Postumum, dargestellt und beurteilt, E. Adickes (Berlin, 1920), p.826. 
Translation belongs to Keith Ward, ibid,pp349 
 
9
 Rom Harre, One Thousand Years of Philosophy(Blackwell Publishers: 
Oxford,2001),pp326 
                                                             7 
when they do this they acquire a collective(social) identity. The ethical community 
creates this identity by changing people's attitudes in favor of altruism and 
friendship and this eradicates the social context of evil, a context in which 
individuals want to affirm an unjust superiority over others.  The social context of 
evil feeds from the emotions of arrogance, envy, and ingratitude. The source of 
these emotions is comparative self-love (self-conceit) - our tendency to claim that 
we are worthier than others. This contradicts the principle of morality, which 
holds that we are equal in dignity since we all have rational faculties that (when 
we exercise them correctly) make us autonomous. Kant thinks that this social 
context based on self-conceit should be done away with and in its place an 
association in the form of an ethical community should be established. This is the 
only way we can succeed in our fight against evil. If the source of evil is social, 
then the struggle against evil should be social too10. In Kant’s words, this struggle 
cannot accomplish its purpose “... by the exertion of the single individual toward 
his own moral perfection, but instead requires a union of such individuals into a 
whole working toward the same end”(Ak 6:97-98) Once again, this is a union in 
an ethical community(Ak 6:94) 
         Kantian ethics is also misinterpreted when it is solely treated within the 
metaphysics of morals. It is true that Kant deduced the moral laws in a 
metaphysical way by making use of concepts that are not grounded in human 
experience-concepts such as the universabilizity of maxims, the end of humanity 
and autonomy. On the basis of this, it is thought that Kant saw ethics as simply 
                                                
10
 Christine Korsgaard, Patrick Frierson and Allen Wood are some Kant scholars who 
have written about this aspect of Kant’s ethics. Allen Wood puts heavy emphasis on the 
social form of the struggle(formation of an “ethical community”) against evil. Please 
see Allen Wood, “ Religion, Ethical Community and the Struggle Against Evil”, 
unpublished essay available online at 
http://www.stanford.edu/~allenw/webpapers/EthicalCommunity.doc and Allen Wood,” 
Kant and the Problem of Human Nature” in Jacobs Brian(ed), Essays on Kant’s 
Anthropology( NY: Cambridge University Press,2003)p38-59. Please also see Christine 
Korsgaard, Creating the Kingdom of Ends(Cambridge:Cambridge University 
Press,1999)pp188-212. Korsgaard argues that according to Kant entering into 
associations and reciprocal relations of responsibility(i.e. friendship) is a duty necessary 
for moral development. Patrick Frierson’s following work is a good discussion of the 
ethical community : “Providence and Divine Mercy in Kant’s Ethical 
Cosmopolitanism”, unpublished essay available online at 
http://people.whitman.edu/~frierspr/kant_providence.htm ),pp4.  I will draw heavily 
upon these scholars for the construction of my argument. 
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recognizing the laws of pure practical reason and acting on the basis of these 
laws11. I think that this is not an accurate picture of Kant’s ethics.  Kant also took 
the question “what is a human being” from a moral point of view and discussed 
what a human being can do to do away with his characteristics that prevent him 
from acting on the moral laws and to cultivate the characteristics that help him 
recognize the moral law. Kant calls this the science of “moral anthropology” 
meaning “morality applied to the human being”12  It is “the counterpart of a 
metaphysics of morals” which concerns “the subjective conditions in human 
nature that hinder people or help them in the carrying-out of the laws of the 
metaphysics of morals”(Ak 6:217) This is a morally guided psychology13. For 
Kant it is of great importance because without knowledge of the human being, 
ethics has little effect on human beings: “The reason that morals and sermons... 
have little effect is due to the lack (Mangel) of knowledge of the human being. 
Morals must (muss) be united (verbunden...mit) knowledge of humanity” (Ak 
25:471-2) In this thesis, I will also pursue Kant’s views on moral anthropology 
and link it with the concept of an ethical community. According to this linkage, 
the ethical community does away with the psychological hindrances to the 
recognition of the moral law. 
         I will, therefore, argue against the formalist, irreligious, individualistic and 
purely metaphysical readings of Kant’s ethics. My thesis will proceed in the 
following way. In Chapter 1, I will demonstrate that Kant thinks that a selfish 
pursuit of happiness is doomed to failure.  For Kant, one should rather aim at 
bringing about general happiness in which he can partake in proportion to his 
virtue. As I demonstrate in Chapter 2, this is not only the correct way of 
approaching happiness but also a duty.  I argue, in Chapter 3, that this aim can be 
                                                
 
11
 Stephen Engstrom hints at this idea by arguing that the duty to promote the highest 
good is a duty addressed to the ethical community. See Stephen Engstrom, “The 
Concept of the Highest Good in Kant’s Moral Theory,” Philosophy and 
Phenomenological. Research, Volume 51, 1992, p. 747-780,pp776-777 
 
12
 Kant, Moral Mrongovius II 29:599. Translation belongs to Robert Louden, ibid,pp61.  
 
13
 Robert Louden calls this “the second part of morals”, the first part being the 
metaphysics of morals and the deduction of moral laws: Robert Louden, “The Second 
Part of Morals”, in  Jacobs Brian(ed), Essays on Kant’s Anthropology( NY: Cambridge 
University Press,2003, pp60-84 
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accomplished only through the formation of an ethical community. Chapter 3 is 
therefore devoted to elucidating what Kant understands by an ethical community 
with specific attention to the religious nature of that community. This will 
culminate in the argument of my thesis: that it is a duty upon individuals to 
promote the highest good (general happiness distributed in proportion to virtue) 
and to be able to discharge this duty, they need to develop a beneficent and 
unselfish will and unite together in an ethical community. 
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CHAPTER 2:  
KANT ON THE SELFISH PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS 
 
2.1 How does an individual pursue his happiness? 
 
         Kant gives a utilitarian account of how an individual pursues his happiness. 
According to this account, happiness is “continuous well-being, enjoyment of life, 
complete satisfaction with one’s condition” (Ak 6:480). It is pleasure or 
agreeableness and is measurable in terms of magnitude, duration, costliness and 
fecundity (Ak 5: 23-24).  It consists in a state of contentment with one’s state 
together with the assurance that this state will last for the future (Ak393, 5:25, Ak 
6:387). It is having one’s desires/wishes satisfied (Ak 5:124) In order to be happy, 
an individual needs to satisfy his desires, experience pleasurable episodes and be 
content with himself. Striving after happiness is a natural necessity for all people; 
happiness is an end for all (Ak416) 
         Kant’s utilitarian account of the selfish pursuit of happiness is a quite 
sophisticated one. This is because Kant takes into account the fact that people do 
not only experience feelings of pleasure and pain but also take an attitude towards 
those feelings and towards their life as a whole14. Kant thinks that when judging 
himself to be happy or miserable, an individual uses his mind (Gemüth) to 
consider his life as a whole and not just particular moments of pleasure and pain. 
This is a capacity unique to humanity; on this account, animals can experience 
pain and pleasure but not happiness or misery. Furthermore, and more 
importantly, the mind(Gemüth) can find certain pains endurable or even beneficial 
for wider goals(i.e. the goal of human development) Therefore, a man can 
experience contentment(Zufriedenheit) while having a painful episode; this 
                                                
14
 Susan Meld Shell explains this point aptly( Susan Meld Shell,” Kant’s True Economy 
of Human Nature” Jacob Brian, ibid, p 196-199 
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contentment is a different state of being from positive enjoyment(Genuss) People 
have the capacity to estimate the value of pleasure and pain; people may be so 
strong as to not let pain and pleasure “disturb their mental rest”(Ak:17) Kant even 
goes so far to suggest that such a strong soul is the happiest soul because it can 
embrace with great composure whatever pains or pleasures life provides him with. 
All this suggests that for Kant, attitude towards pain and pleasure is as important 
as the experience of pain and pleasure as far as happiness is concerned. 
         Kant thinks that our pursuit of happiness is actually constant shunning pain 
rather than pursuing the idea of an “unbroken happiness”. He expresses this in the 
following words: 
 
“Although Mohammed tried to fill heaven with pure, sensible wantonness, 
it effected as little as when we promise unnamable joys. Pain effects more 
forcefully; of it we can make a graspable [faesslich] concept- as is already 
shown by the Mosaic story of creation... Happiness [Glück] is what frees 
us from pain... Man cannot represent to himself what an enduring 
enjoyment would be, in which fear and hope did not interchange. 
Mohammed said of Paradise that it contains a very great supply of food, 
and very great enjoyment with the female sex, with the so-called beautiful 
Houris. But human beings are not much enticed by this, and fear of future 
ill has more effect; for we cannot think to ourselves an idea of unbroken 
happiness[Glück]; our concepts of happiness depend upon an exchange of 
well-being and pain”(Ak:1073-5)  
 
Pain is easier for us to represent to ourselves than the idea of an enduring and 
unbroken enjoyment. Therefore, avoiding pain is our main drive in our pursuit of 
happiness. 
          Kant also makes a distinction between various kinds of pleasure or 
enjoyment: pleasures of sense, ideal pleasures and intellectual pleasures (Ak: 560). 
Pleasures of sense arise when we sense an object of pleasure while ideal pleasures 
arise through mere thinking of the object of pleasure without coming into direct 
contact with it(i.e. as in enjoying the plot of a novel) Intellectual pleasure, on the 
other hand, arises from the consciousness of following the moral law and can be 
called moral self-contentment. 
         The most important aspect of Kant’s sophisticated utilitarianism, however, 
concerns the systematic nature of the pursuit of happiness. Happiness does not 
consist in the satisfaction of all inclinations that an individual has. An individual 
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often chooses not to satisfy certain desires that he judges to be destructive of his 
idea of happiness. A  gout-sufferer, for example, may forego the pleasure of a 
delicious dinner for the sake of his happiness which is dependant on his health(Ak 
4:399)Kant says that individuals sum up their inclinations and desires(first-order 
desires) into the idea of happiness(a second-order desire) which is pursued 
systematically (Ak 4:399) In the example of the gout-sufferer shows, the first-
order desire of a delicious dinner is excluded from the idea of happiness because it 
contradicted the desire of a healthy life. When we form an idea of happiness we 
make attempts to avoid contradiction between desires. Happiness is a system of 
inclinations “brought into a tolerable system” (Ak 5:73-76) Human beings, unlike 
animals, have negative freedom to choose against satisfying certain desires for the 
sake of a harmony among desires.  
  
 
2.2 The failure of the systematic and selfish pursuit of happiness 
 
         John Kekes, a contemporary theorist of happiness, says that creating an idea 
of happiness as a second-order desire requires deciding which first-order desires 
are important and deserve to be included in the idea of happiness15. In order to be 
able to make this decision, an individual needs to have a notion of the kind of life 
he wants to live. Happiness, therefore, is also the construction of one’s life plan. In 
our earlier example, the gout-sufferer found health of paramount importance and 
did not allow the first-order desires that contradicted health into his idea of 
happiness. 
         Kant, as we saw, would agree with Kekes on this point. He thinks, however, 
that what we find important in terms of our happiness is ever-changing and it 
generally fails us. In other words, our effort to construct a life plan according to an 
idea of happiness is doomed to failure. This is because “even though everyone 
wishes to attain happiness, yet he can never say definitely and consistently what it 
is that he really wishes and wills”(Ak418) The concept of happiness is very 
indeterminate; it is “impossible for the most insightful and at the same time most 
powerful, but nonetheless finite, being to frame here a determinate concept of 
                                                
15
 John Kekes,”Happiness” in Mind, New Series, Vol 91, No. 363( Jul.,1982), 358-376  
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what it is that he really wills”(Ak418) Kant gives the example of a person who 
pursues a plan of a happy life based on wealth only to realize later that wealth only 
makes him less happy because other people always want to make use of him. In an 
alternative scenario, wealth can generate needs the satisfaction of which is beyond 
his power. To give another Kantian example, a person who finds the key to a 
happy life in the good of knowledge may be frustrated due to the dreadful evils 
which knowledge reveals to him. “Therefore, one cannot act according to 
determinate principles in order to be happy, but only according to empirical 
counsels, e.g., of diet, frugality, politeness, reserve, etc., which are shown by 
experience to contribute on the average the most to well-being” but which are 
fallible(Ak419) 
         This is why happiness is not an idea of (pure) reason but of imagination. The 
faculty of imagination creates an ideal which is based on experience but 
impossible to attain (Ak419) This is why happiness is a “fluctuating idea” 
(Ak399), not determinate as to what it promises. And this is exactly the reason 
many people tend, in some circumstances, to listen to their instincts and enjoy the 
“present moment” rather than pursue a “possibly groundless expectation” of 
happiness (Ak399) 
         Reason’s guidance for a happy life is “weak and delusive” (Ak 395). 
Reason’s instrumental use to achieve happiness never results in true contentment: 
“In fact, we find that the more a cultivated reason devotes itself to the aim of 
enjoying life and happiness, the further does man get away from true 
contentment” (Ak: 395) The “more common run of men” who allow themselves to 
be guided by mere natural instinct are to be envied (Ak: 396). 
          To conclude this chapter, Kant’s account of the selfish pursuit of happiness 
is utilitarian. Happiness of an individual is a function of the satisfaction of his 
needs, inclinations and desires. This usually takes the form of shunning pain 
because pain has a greater force in moving people than the idea of an enduring 
pleasure.  
         Kant’s utilitarian account is a quite sophisticated one because he argues that 
the pursuit of happiness rests on freedom on two grounds. First, we have the 
freedom to take an attitude with respect to the pains and pleasures we experience 
in our life as a whole. We have the ability to not let certain painful episodes 
disturb our state of contentment with life. Secondly, we have the freedom to 
                                                             14 
choose against satisfying all our desires. We exercise this by creating an ideal (a 
plan) of happiness, a second-order desire in which the first-order desires are 
pursued in harmony. 
         Kant thinks that an individual never finds contentment while pursuing his 
plan of happiness. This is because the plan can never become a determinate plan 
of happiness. There is no guarantee, for example, that a plan based on the 
acquisition of goods such as wealth, knowledge, health is to result in happiness. 
Empirical counsels which are shown to contribute to happiness on average (i.e. 
politeness, diet, frugality) –but which are open to exceptions- are all an individual 
can hope for. 
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CHAPTER 3: 
   KANT ON THE UNSELFISH PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS 
 
         Kant thinks that the indeterminacy and failure of the rational and selfish 
pursuit of happiness should not condemn us to the instinctual pursuit of happiness. 
What we can do is to do away with the selfishness of our wish for happiness and 
try, by exercising our rational faculties, to create happiness for all and partake in 
that general happiness in proportion to our virtue. In fact, this is the highest good. 
It is not only an option but also a duty to promote the highest good 
         As we saw, we promote general happiness by discharging the duty of 
beneficence-duty to promote other people’s morally permissible happiness.  The 
argument that Kant gives for why we have this duty (duty of beneficence) is the 
following: 
 
“Since our self-love cannot be separated from our need to be loved(helped in 
case  of need) by others as well, we therefore make ourselves an end for 
others; and the only way this maxim can be binding is through its 
qualification as a universal law, hence through our will to make others our 
ends as well. The happiness of others is therefore an end that is also a duty” 
(Ak 6:394) 
 
The argument is simple: “If I cannot make myself an end for others without 
making them (that is, their happiness) my end, I have the duty to promote the 
happiness of others”. This duty is a wide (imperfect) duty. There is no specific 
limit to how far we should go in promoting the happiness of others. How far one 
should go depends “on what each person’s true needs are in view of his 
sensibilities and it must be left to each to decide for himself”. Giving a hungry 
person food, a true need for him, would probably be a good way to discharge the 
duty of beneficence. Buying him an expensive car, on the contrary, would 
probably be not such a good way to proceed. The idea is that one should employ 
his practical wisdom in deciding how this duty should be carried out. It is 
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important to be reminded that according to Kant, we can refrain from helping 
others when we think that helping them would be detrimental to their happiness. 
         While promoting the happiness of others, however, Kant thinks that we 
should not be indifferent to our own happiness. This is because “discontent with 
one’s condition under many pressing cares and amid unsatisfied wants might 
easily become a great temptation to transgress one’s duties” (G: 12, Ak: 399) Kant 
obviously is making an (empirical) observation: an unhappy person is more likely 
to transgress his duty than a happy individual. On the basis of this, he thinks that 
we should not neglect our own happiness because if we are unhappy we are more 
likely to transgress our duties. 
         Discharging the duty of beneficence and indirect duty to secure our own 
happiness are not the only ways to promote general happiness. As we saw, the 
general happiness in the highest good is general happiness in proportion to virtue 
(Ak 129). The highest good is actually general happiness in a moral world (KA 
809, KB837) We therefore have the duty to create a moral world to be able to 
promote the highest good. In a moral world, we would be the authors of our well-
being and that of others (KA 809, KB 837) 
         The duty to promote the highest good can be deduced in the following 
way16: 
 
           1. It is a duty to act according to the moral law 
2. Acting in accordance with the moral law is the only way a moral world   
can be promoted. 
3. The highest good is the moral world. Moral world is conducive to general     
happiness distributed according to virtue. 
 
If this formulation is correct, then the highest good is not the source of motivation 
for moral action but rather the object morally motivated people have to produce. 
Therefore, the concept of the highest good does not contradict Kant’s insistence to 
rule out any motivation for morality other than respect for the moral law17. 
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 This deduction is well captured by Pauline Kleingeld. See Pauline Kleingeld, “ What 
do the Virtuous Hope For?Re-reading Kant’s Doctrine of the Highest Good”, 
Proceedings of the Eighth International Kant Congress(Memphis,Marquette University 
Press, 1995),pp96 
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         Why would be a moral world be conducive to general happiness? In other 
words, how does our moralization cause general happiness? At least three reasons 
are possible to think of. First, members of the moral world (“the kingdom of 
ends”) do not pursue ends that contradict each other. That is, they do not interfere 
with each other’s freedom to pursue happiness. Secondly, as we saw, members of 
the moral world contribute to the morally permissible happiness of others. And 
thirdly, members of the moral world cannot be happy unless others are happy too. 
This is because their ends are moral ends. They would be happy only through the 
satisfaction of their moral ends. For example, they would be happy by fighting 
against the suffering in the world. They would not enjoy a hedonistic kind of 
happiness in the midst of other people’s sufferings. They would rather enjoy a 
happiness that arises from the satisfaction of moral ends and it is the pursuit of this 
kind of happiness that contributes to general happiness. 
The duty to promote the highest good does not only include the duty to 
promote the general happiness but also to distribute general happiness according 
to virtue. This aspect of the duty is problematic. The problem is based on Kant’s 
own assertion that what determines virtue is the disposition of the moral agent that 
no one can know but the agent himself. A behavior that has the appearance of a 
virtuous one might actually have nothing to do with virtue because it might be 
motivated by self-love- as in the case of a shopkeeper who charges a fair price in 
order to avoid earning a bad reputation which can decrease his profit. In other 
words, we cannot know if a person has virtue and this makes us unable to 
distribute happiness according to virtue. It could be argued that since performing 
this duty is impossible and “ought to” (duty) implies “can” (possibility to perform 
the duty) there can be no such duty at all. 
                                                                                                                                          
good” does not belong to Kant’s pure ethics. See the following works.  1)Schopenhauer. 
The World as Will and Representation, (trans) E.F.J. Payne[New York:Dover 
Publications, 1958) 2:254, (trans) Stephen Engstrom, 2) Lewis White Beck, A 
Commentary on Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason[Chicago:University of Chicago 
Press, 1960], 242-245, 3)Jeffrie G. Murphy, ” The Highest Good as Content for Kant’s 
Ethical Formalism,” Kant Studien 56[1965]:102-10, 4)Thomas Auxter, “ The 
Unimportance of Kant’s Highest Good,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 17[April 
1979]:121-34”. This is not an accurate criticism because the “highest good” is not a 
motivation of moral action but the object it has to produce. 
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Kant was aware of this problem and dealt with it by means of the postulate 
of God’s existence. As we saw, “the possibility of the highest good... occurs only 
under the condition of the existence of God” (Ak 5:124-25) This is because only 
God can ensure the distribution of happiness according to virtue. The promotion 
of the highest good happens, therefore, through a division of labor between God 
and us. We promote general happiness without proportioning it to virtue because 
we cannot assess the virtue of people. We then leave it to God to make the 
distribution according to virtue (in this world and in afterlife); we hope that God 
takes care of that. On the basis of this hope, we act as if it is possible that 
happiness can be distributed according to virtue. This hope is necessary “from a 
moral point of view, 
 
in order to add through mere ideas of reason a final touch to the theory of the  
possibility of that to which we are already of itself obligated, namely striving 
after the advancement  of the highest good in the world, while we ourselves 
make these objects, God, freedom in a practical quality, and immortality, 
only as a result of the advancement of moral laws and freely give them 
objective reality, because we are assured that no contradiction can be found 
in these ideas”(AK, 20:298-99)18 
 
By coming up with the ideas of God and immortality and hoping that God 
distributes happiness in proportion to virtue in this world and in afterlife, we can 
take upon ourselves the duty to promote the highest good.  
According to Kant, by pursuing the highest good we satisfy a need of our 
reason. “It cannot be a matter of indifference to reason how to answer the 
question, What then is the result of this right conduct of ours?”(Ak 6:5) This need 
is ”effected in [the human will] by morality” and it is a need “of adding to the 
thought of one’s duties an ultimate end as well, as their consequence”(Ak 6,6) In 
other words, we(our reason) would be dissatisfied if we did not direct our good 
conduct towards the ultimate end of general happiness. 
As a conclusion to this chapter, happiness in the highest good is general 
happiness distributed in proportion to virtue. This is not a hedonistic account of 
happiness. It is causally related to morality. The happiness in the highest good is 
achieved through the creation of a moral world that is conducive to general 
happiness. This achievement is the task of cooperating and unselfish individuals 
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 I have used Paul Guyer’s translation. See Guyer, ibid,pp364 
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who make “the happiness of all” their end. I will argue that for Kant, this 
cooperation means the uniting of people in the ethical community. Collective 
happiness can only be an accomplishment of individuals who aim to make the 
sensible world conform to the moral world by establishing an ethical community. 
This is why the next chapter is devoted to an analysis of what Kant means by an 
ethical community. 
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  CHAPTER 4:  
    THE ETHICAL COMMUNITY 
 
   4.1 The features and the religious source of the ethical community 
 
 
Kant uses the notion of an ethical community in his Religion. He says that 
“an association of human beings merely under the laws of virtue, ruled by this 
idea, can be called an ethical and, so far as these laws are public, an ethico-civil 
(in contrast to juridico-civil) society, or an ethical community” (Ak 6:94) The 
laws of virtue that govern the ethical community establish a unity between the 
ends of rational beings. In the words of Allen Wood:” Between the ends of 
rational beings there would be a reciprocity, so that the pursuit of each end would 
advance the pursuit of others, and human ends would constitute a self-organizing 
whole, combined into a unity like the parts of a living organism”19 Ethical 
community is therefore the concretization of the ideal: “kingdom of ends”.  
According to Kant, to form an ethical community is a duty of human beings. In 
other words, the idea of an ethical community has an “entirely well-grounded, 
objective reality in human reason, in the duty to join such a state” (Ak 6:95) 
Kant recognizes four features of the ethical community. First, the 
membership in the community is universal because its unity is based on laws of 
virtue shared by all rational beings (Ak 7:333) This is Kant’s ethical 
cosmopolitanism. Secondly, the incentives that motivate membership in it are pure 
moral incentives. The third feature is freedom, which means that the ethical 
community does not allow the rule of a coercive government. Fourthly, the 
constitution of the ethical community is unchangeable though its mode of 
administration is free and open (Ak 6:101-102). 
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 Allen Wood, “ Religion, Ethical Community and the Struggle Against Evil”, 
unpublished essay available online 
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The unity of the ethical community is not maintained by a coercive state. 
The ethical community is not a political community. Still, the ethical community 
has public laws just as the political community- though these are laws of virtue. 
Kant thinks that a combined will of the members of the community (general will) 
cannot be the legislator of the public laws of virtue. “Such a fallible and 
contingently restricted will would be inappropriate for a moral community”20 Only 
the will of God satisfies the condition of purity that is required of the will that can 
be the legislator of the laws of virtue (Ak 6:227: 6:99) The legislator of the ethical 
community is, therefore, God and the ethical community is a religious community. 
Religion, here, is not an established religion with all its textual sources and 
institutional structure. What Kant has in mind is moral religion where “religion is 
simply the recognition of our duties as divine commands” (Ak 6:153: 6:443)  
As I hinted earlier, Kant’s indication of a divine source of legislation may be 
found to be in contradiction with Kant’s principle of the “autonomy of the will” 
(Ak 440). According to that principle, “the will is a law to itself” (Ak 440) That is, 
the will imposes on itself its own laws. If the laws of virtue are legislated by God, 
it may seem that the will is not a law to itself but rather that God’s law is a law to 
the will. 
As we saw, Kant solves this problem by saying that we should not represent 
God to ourselves as an alien entity that imposes on us alien laws.  God is the 
source of the moral principle within us. In Kant’s words, “God must be 
represented not as substance outside me, but as the highest moral principle in 
me”21.  “The conception of God is... the pure practical Reason itself in its 
personality”22. Another expression of this idea is: 
 
” There is a Being in me, distinguished from myself as the cause of an effect 
wrought upon me, which freely... judges me within, justifying or 
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 Allen Wood, “ Religion, Ethical Community and the Struggle Against Evil”, 
unpublished essay available online at  
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 Kant’s Opus Postumum, dargestellt und beurteilt, E. Adickes (Berlin, 1920), p.826. 
The translation belongs to Keith Ward, “Kant’s Teleological Ethics”, The Philosophical 
Quarterly, Vol 21, No.85( Oct., 1971), 337-351,pp349 
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 Kant’s Opus Postumum, dargestellt und beurteilt, E. Adickes (Berlin, 1920), p.826. 
Translation belongs to Keith Ward, ibid,pp349 
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condemning me; and I as man am myself this being, and it is no substance 
external to me, and... its causality is no natural necessity but a determination 
of me to a free act23”  
 
This is what I called the immanent conception of God in Kant’s thought. It does 
not replace but exists side by side with the transcendental conception. Kant seems 
to imply that since we cannot comprehend God as a transcendental entity, we 
should represent God to ourselves according to the immanent conception.  This is 
the only way to have a rational religion. If we recognize God in his immanence, 
our belief in his transcendence can be considered rational. The ethical community 
is therefore a religious and rational community Its members partake in a divine 
essence as they accept the laws of virtue that bind the community. This establishes 
that the religious nature of the ethical community does not contradict Kant’s 
principle autonomy.  
         The question remains, however, why Kant thinks religion is essential to the 
ethical community. Allen Wood and Patrick Frierson provide us with two different 
answers to this question. 
According to Allen Wood, Kant’s insistence on the religious nature of the 
ethical community does not stem from the fact that belief in God is a prerequisite 
for membership in the ethical community. In fact, Wood thinks that Kant did not 
see belief in God as a condition for membership in the ethical community. Wood 
makes use of Kant’s following view that we also saw earlier: 
 
“No assertoric knowledge (even of God’s existence) is required, [but] only a 
problematic assumption (hypothesis) as regards speculation about the 
supreme cause of things: faith needs merely the idea of God... only the 
minimum cognition (it is possible that there is a God) has to be objectively 
sufficient” (Ak 6: 153-154)    
        
Wood infers from this passage that an agnostic position, insofar as it is a position 
that does not deny the possibility of the existence of God, is acceptable for the 
ethical community. Allen Wood explains this in the following way: 
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“To be religious, then, I do not even have to believe in the existence of God.   
To be religious, then, I do not even have to believe in the existence of God. 
Religion requires that I have duties, that I have a concept of God (as a 
possible supreme cause of things), and that my awareness of duty is 
subjectively enlivened by the thought that if there is a God, then my duties 
are divine commands”24 
 
Wood then goes on to explain how an agnostic, who is undecided about God, can 
magnify his awareness of his duty by seeing the laws of virtue as divine 
commands. The agnostic should ask himself, Wood thinks, the question: If the 
laws of virtue that govern the ethical community were not divine commands, 
could these laws have public recognition by the members of the ethical 
community as binding?(Ak 6:227, 6:99) According to Wood, the best way an 
agnostic may think of the moral laws as having public recognition is to think of 
them as issued by  (possible or actual) God whose sovereignty unites people in an 
ethical community25 The agnostic, therefore, has to grant that laws of virtue would 
not be publicly recognized and would not be able to bind the members of ethical 
community if they were not divinely authorized. This is similar to saying that the 
agnostic may feel the bond with the community only through having a religious 
perspective towards his duties. 
Patrick Frierson rejects Wood’s position and argues that membership in the 
ethical community demands the “psychologically compelling force of belief”26. 
Frierson’s interpretation makes use of Kant’s argument that non-belief in God 
“damages the moral disposition” (Ak 5:452-3) Kant gives the example of a 
righteous man (like Spinoza) who has a firm conviction that there is no God. Kant 
thinks that “his effort [to be righteous] is limited “because nature does not 
cooperate with him and does not endow him with happiness. Spinoza who would 
not want his virtue to be the cause of his misery has to “give up as impossible” his 
striving for morality. The only way to avoid this would be “to assume the 
existence of the moral author of the world, i.e. of God” (Ak 5:452-3). The 
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cultivation of moral disposition that is demanded of the members of the ethical 
community is impossible without the psychologically compelling belief in God 
and divine mercy (in the doctrine that God helps those who want to eradicate the 
radical evil in themselves). 
Frierson’s interpretation has some advantages over the interpretation of 
Wood. Wood’s interpretation that allows room for the agnostic in the ethical 
community cannot adequately explain how a person (the agnostic) would see 
himself as a part of a community under divine command when he is skeptical of 
God. Furthermore, as we saw, Kant clearly states that without a firm belief in God, 
one’s effort to cultivate a moral disposition is limited.  
Still, Wood’s point that an agnostic position is adequate for a moral 
disposition is well rooted in Kant’s assertion that we only need the idea of the 
possibility of God’s existence to be rationally consistent in our strive after virtue. 
Therefore, I argue that belief in God is not a necessary condition in membership in 
the ethical community but it helps us to bond with the laws of the ethical 
community much strongly by making a compelling effect on our psychology.    
         Kant makes several important points while endorsing this view. The first is 
that the doctrines of God and divine mercy should have “universal 
communicability” (Ak 6:96) Therefore, these doctrines should be purified from 
historical contingencies and dogmas of established religions. Kant is therefore 
after “pure religion” which is “within the limits of reason”. This is why Kant’s 
allusions to Scriptures should be read not as historical allusions but as attempts to 
establish a rational religion. A good example for the kind of Biblical interpretation 
that Kant favors would be an interpretation that does not so much make use of 
Jesus’ divinity and miracles as the (moral) parables that Jesus teaches. If religion 
is seen as pure, rational and beyond the dogmas and contingencies of established 
religions, the cosmopolitan nature of the ethical community is not compromised. 
No particular religion, with a set of historical contingencies and dogmas, can gain 
ascendancy over others and exclude them.   
The second important point Kant makes is that the doctrine of divine mercy 
should not be interpreted in such a way as to inhibit morality. If divine mercy is so 
interpreted as to suggest 1) that morally good conduct is not a human 
accomplishment but only a gift from God (Ak 6:191), and 2) that God will simply 
forgive and take care of people irrespective of their virtue (Ak 6:76), and 3) that 
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rituals, endorsed by the Church, will gain people the favor of God (Ak6:170), then 
divine mercy would not contribute to morality but rather inhibit it. All of these 
mistaken interpretations would drive people to laziness in their effort for morality. 
The worst of all, they would make people justify their laziness with the belief that 
God takes care of all irrespective of their effort. The only morally acceptable 
interpretation of divine mercy is that God helps only those who develop a good 
moral disposition “through their own powers” (Ak6:191). As for rituals, Kant 
finds the belief that mere observance of religious rituals can help people in any 
way unacceptable (Ak 6:170). He emphatically says that “ Apart from a good life-
conduct, anything which the human being supposes that he can do to become well-
pleasing to God is mere religious delusion”(Ak6:170)Therefore, the service of 
priestcraft that uses petitionary prayers, magic and sorcery and other morally 
indifferent rituals is merely a “counterfeit service” and is despicable(KA 6:151-
202) 
           
     4.2 The need for an ethical community 
 
Why does Kant think that human beings need to form an ethical community? 
The answer that I propose is that for Kant, the ethical community is necessary 
because the nature of evil that human beings should combat is social (“our social 
lives provide fertile breeding grounds for evil”27) and therefore the solution 
against this evil should be social too28.  Human beings need to make a moral 
reform and establish an ethical community. The ethical community changes what 
we care about in our lives. In the ethical community, we care so much about our 
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capacity for virtue that we begin to find marks of superiority in terms of wealth, 
status, and knowledge insignificant.        
Kant thinks that it is very difficult for individuals to fight their evil 
tendencies if they live in societies that foster evil. What does Kant have in mind 
when he speaks about the evil aspects of societies? What is the predisposition in 
human nature that paves the way for the creation of such evil societies?  I will 
argue that according to Kant, we create these evil societies through our propensity 
to see ourselves superior to others. This propensity lies in what Kant calls “our 
predisposition to humanity” and is displayed in our selfish pursuit of happiness. If 
we cannot check our propensity to affirm superiority over others, we are 
condemned to living in a society that fosters envy, distrust, ingratitude and other 
similar vices. These vices bombard our soul and heavily hinder us in our fight 
against evil.    
To see how Kant develops this idea, it is helpful to look at Kant’s discussion 
of human psychology. Kant singles out three predispositions in human nature. One 
of these dispositions is our “animality” meaning a total of our natural desires 
(survival, eating, sex and desire to be among other human beings). The second 
disposition is our “humanity” through which we set ends according to reason and 
create the idea of “happiness” by establishing a harmony between our first-order 
desires. Kant calls the third predisposition”personality”, the capacity for morality, 
which is exercised in giving and obeying the laws of reason (Ak 6:26)   
         In trying to find out which of these three predispositions fosters evil, we may 
rule out the predisposition to personality because evil is exactly what it fights 
against. Now, Kant says that the enemy of morality “is not to be sought in the 
natural inclinations” but rather in the will that is so deceived that it does not 
moderate the pursuit of inclinations and desires in accordance with duty (Ak 6:57-
58) Therefore, the enemy of morality is not the pursuit of happiness but rather the 
pursuit of happiness that is not governed by the commands of duty29.   
         Our predisposition to “humanity” becomes the main source of vice because 
its impact on our pursuit of happiness contradicts the commands of duty. This 
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 To give an example, when we pursue our happiness by satisfying the desires 
that arise from our “animality” without limiting ourselves by the command of duty, we 
fall into the “bestial vices of gluttony, lust and wild lawlessness in relation to other 
human beings”(Ak 6:27)  
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predisposition is based on a comparative use of reason. It contains “a self-love 
which is physical and yet involves comparison” (Ak 6:27). “Out of this 
comparative self-love originates the inclination to gain worth in the opinion of 
others” which is first an inclination to gain equal worth but later leads to an 
“unjust desire to acquire superiority for oneself over others”(Ak 6:27) Kant calls 
this inclination ”self-conceit” or irrational self-love(Ak 5:73-74) Our self-conceit 
contradicts the moral idea that all rational beings are equal in dignity(intrinsic 
worth) (KA 5:73)   According to Kant,  as far as our predisposition to humanity is 
concerned, our self-conceit takes the upper hand in our (selfish) pursuit of 
happiness. This pursuit is based on our comparative use of our reason:” only in 
comparison with others does one judge oneself happy or unhappy” (Ak 6:27) We 
don’t just want to be happy but we want to be happier than and superior to others. 
When combining our inclinations (our first-order desires) into the ideal of 
happiness (a second order desire) we want our ideal of happiness to be superior to 
others. This tendency leads to the “vices of culture” or “diabolical vices” which 
are, “in their extreme degree of malignancy”, “envy, ingratitude, joy in other’s 
misfortunes” (Ak 6:27)   
Allen Wood thinks that this ascendancy to superiority is in fact what drives 
us to come up with an ideal of happiness30. Wood thinks that if it were not for our 
desire to be superior to others, we would rather choose the haphazard satisfaction 
of inclinations instead of a systematic plan of how to pursue the satisfaction of our 
inclinations. In other words, we create a systematic plan of happiness only to stand 
superior in comparison to others.  I do not completely agree with Wood. It is true 
that Kant thinks that while forming our ideal of happiness, we certainly take into 
consideration other people’s ideals of happiness and want to create a better ideal 
than theirs. However, Kant is also aware that we also take into account what kind 
of a life we find meaningful to live in accordance with our character. We engage 
in new horizons of experience to develop a character that we hope will make our 
lives meaningful. Cultivating some desires accords well with the character that we 
want to have and cultivating some others does not. We choose to act on the desires 
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 See Allen Wood, “Kant vs. Eudaimonism”, forthcoming in Predrag Cicovacki (ed.), 
Kant’s Legacy: Essays Dedicated to Lewis White Beck( Rochester: University of 
Rochester Press, 2000) 
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that do accord well. These factors are very important in how we judge about our 
well-being31.   
Still, Wood is correct to say that for Kant, comparative self-love (self-
conceit) is a major component of our pursuit of happiness and is prone to lead to 
vices such as envy, ingratitude, and joy in other people’s misery. To avoid these 
vices, we should check our drive to deny people equal worth.  
These vices (envy, ingratitude, and joy in other people’s misery) arise in a 
social context. They are the consequences of the exercise of self-conceit. Kant 
concedes that self-conceit and the competition among human beings that follows 
from it has a benefit. The antagonism that arises from the competition for 
superiority drives us to develop the faculties of our species driving away from 
laziness (Ak 6:27) On the other hand, however, self-conceit is a powerful 
hindrance to self-mastery and virtue (6:94)  
Kant sometimes calls our comparative self-love(self-conceit) our 
“unsociable sociability”(Ak 8:20-22) This means that seeking comparison with 
others makes us social beings- in that we value the opinion of others concerning 
our worth. At the same time, however, it makes us unsocial beings that claim a 
morally unacceptable superiority over others. This makes us focus on distinctions 
in terms of the components of happiness (i.e., wealth, power, status) rather than on 
the command of morality. This social context, and not the raw human nature, is 
the enemy of morality. In Kant’s words: 
 
“ If [a human being] searches for the causes and the circumstances that draw 
into this danger[i.e., assault of the evil principle] and keep him there, he can 
easily convince himself that they do not come his way from his own raw 
nature... but rather from the human beings to whom he stands in relation or 
association”(Ak 6:93) 
 
 
The assault of the evil principle takes place in the way people associate and the 
rationale of this association, which is the pursuit of happiness driven by self-
conceit. 
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The view that evil arises from the social context [a morally corrupt 
community] should not be taken to mean that we, as individuals, have no moral 
responsibility. That would be a gross misinterpretation of Kant’s ethical thought. 
Because according to Kant, it should be presupposed that we are free either to act 
on self-love (i.e. comparative self love) or act on the basis of the moral law (Ak 
448). In other words, even if the society in which we live tempts us to act on 
morally dangerous desires of envy, arrogance and self-conceit we may choose to 
abide by the command of duty. A social determinist reading of Kant would, 
therefore, be a mistaken interpretation of Kant’s moral thought. 
I want to render the social context of evil not as the determining ground of 
our volition and of our wickedness but rather as a great hindrance to our 
recognition of our capacity for morality. Once again, in a morally corrupt social 
context, we are too preoccupied with comparing ourselves with other people’s 
well-being as constituted by wealth, status and power that we neglect the correct 
(moral) standpoint from which we should evaluate ourselves and others. 
According to this correct (moral) standpoint, we have absolute worth as rational 
beings and our worth is not determined in comparison with others. We may lose 
worth and feel shame not because others are superior to us in terms of social 
efficacy but because we do not abide by the moral law. The social context based 
on unsociable sociability causes vice by turning our attention away from this 
correct (moral) standpoint from which we should evaluate ourselves and others. 
Moral responsibility, however, belongs to us- it is our duty to discover the proper 
(moral) evaluation. In fact, the moral reform and the establishment of the ethical 
community may only occur when we discharge this duty of correct evaluation of 
others and ourselves.  
Kant thinks that not only the self-conceited but also the hermit (who denies 
association with others) fails to discover the proper (moral) evaluation according 
to which we have absolute worth as rational beings. Kant calls the hermit’s 
attitude “negative misanthropy”, ”timidity”, ”anthropophobia” (Ak 6:450) The 
hermit’s attitude contradicts the duties of love and the duty to associate. The duty 
to associate is a “duty to oneself as well as others not to isolate oneself, but to use 
one’s moral perfection in social intercourse to cultivate a disposition of 
reciprocity--agreeableness, tolerance, mutual love and respect...and so to associate 
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the graces with virtue. To bring this about is itself a duty of virtue.”(Ak 6:473)The 
hermit’s attitude contradicts this duty to associate. 
The solution that Kant has in mind is therefore not to deny association but 
rather change the nature of the association. In other words, the solution is to turn 
the association into the ethical community, the features of which has been 
discussed earlier. This solution is indispensable to fight evil and accomplish the 
highest good (virtue combined with happiness) In Kant’s words: 
 
“The highest good cannot be achieved merely by the exertion of the single 
individual toward his own moral perfection, but instead requires a union of 
such individuals into a whole working toward the same end- a system of 
well-disposed human beings, in which and through whose unity alone the 
highest good can come to pass”(Ak 6:97-98) 
 
 
Kant is emphatic that well-disposed human beings should unite. This is clearly an 
indication of Kant’s conviction that without such a union, the social context based 
on competition, resentment and self-conceit will continue to foster evil and limit 
the effort of people to cultivate a good disposition. Another firm conviction of 
Kant is that well-disposed human beings (whose union is the ethical community) 
can only be brought about through moral education: “man must be educated to be 
good” (6:324-5) When Kant says “moral education”, he does not only have in 
mind the question how human beings discover the Categorical Imperative. 
Another aspect of moral education is how human beings can come to know the 
subjective conditions that make it difficult for them to follow to moral law (i.e., 
desire for wealth, status, power) and then remove those conditions. This aspect is, 
as we saw earlier, what Kant calls the “counterpart of metaphysics of morals”, is 
critical for the ethical community (Ak 6:217). Therefore, the ethical community 
should have not only laws of virtue but also measures to remove the hindrances to 
morality- conditions that make it difficult for human beings to follow the moral 
law.  
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4.3 The content of the ethical community 
 
 
What are the content of the laws of virtue and the ways in which hindrances 
to morality can be removed? The answer that I propose to this question is the 
following: The laws of virtue that keep the ethical community together are laws 
that express the duties of respect and duties of love to others. The laws that 
express the duties of respect to others are: “1) Do not treat others with contempt,2) 
Do not defame others, 3) Do not ridicule others” The laws that express the duties 
of love to others are: 1) Promote the happiness of others, 2) Show gratitude to 
your benefactor, 3) Cultivate your feeling of sympathy for others. All these laws 
have the common quality of making us realize that we share an equal worth due to 
our humanity. 
Treating others with contempt is a mark of arrogance. Arrogance is an 
ambition to be on top (oben zu schwimmen) and to demand that “others think little 
of themselves in comparison with us” (Ak 6:645) It contradicts the principle of 
morality according to which every one has equal intrinsic worth. Hence the law,” 
Do not treat others with contempt”. The ethical community has to be against the 
competition for honor and boasting about ranks of honor since this competition 
kills the spirit of equality in human dignity. Similarly, defaming others by 
gossiping about them and exposing their faults with the aim of ruining their 
reputation is unacceptable in the ethical community (Ak 6:466) Ridicule, which is 
making the faults of other people an object of amusement, is a vice that the ethical 
community should avoid (Ak 6:647) What the ethical community should do is not 
to legally punish the defamers and ridiculers but rather to promote a culture in 
which defamers and ridiculers cannot breed.  Kant does not spell out how this may 
be done. But, it could be speculated that a good way to proceed would be to 
expose the defamers and ridiculers to their own ignorance of the moral principle 
based on human dignity. 
Kant thinks that a culture that promotes the vices of arrogance, defamation 
and ridicule creates a servile disposition in people who fall behind in the race of 
competition. Kant is against this servile disposition as much as the arrogant 
disposition. A servile person violates a duty to his self by treating himself with 
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contempt rather than with the intrinsic value befitting a human being. To avoid the 
servile disposition, Kant makes the following suggestions: 
 
“ Be no man’s lackey.- Do not let others tread with impunity on your rights.- 
Contract no debt for which you cannot give full security.- Do not accept 
favors you could do without, and do not be a parasite or a flatterer or ... a 
beggar... Kneeling down or prostrating oneself on the ground, even to show 
your veneration for heavenly objects, is contrary to the dignity of humanity... 
for you then humble yourself, not before an ideal represented to you by your 
own reason, but before an idol of your making”(Ak 6:437) 
The ethical community, therefore, should not have a culture that fosters servility. 
It is noteworthy that Kant emphatically rejects “intellectual servility”: humbly 
accepting the guidance of idols and ideals that have not their origins in human 
reason. In other words, Kant’s ethical community is also a project of 
Enlightenment meaning “man's emergence from his self-incurred immaturity” 
where immaturity is “the inability to use own one's understanding without the 
guidance from another”32. Kant’s ethical community does not guarantee anyone 
irrational authority to be the moral teacher of the community. The standard to 
judge any moral teaching is pure practical reason. 
The ethical community is characterized not only by laws that follow from 
the duties of respect but also from the duties of love. The duties of love are duties 
of beneficence, gratitude and the cultivation of a sympathetic feeling toward 
others. The duty of beneficence is, as we saw, to promote according to one’s 
means the happiness of others in need, without hoping for something in return 
(6:453) Gratitude consists in honoring a person because of a benefit he rendered. 
This honoring should not be based on a “prudential maxim” of encouraging the 
benefactor for further beneficence but rather on sincere appreciation of his help. 
Duty to cultivate a sympathetic feeling is a duty to share in other people’s feelings 
of joy and misery. Kant thinks that Nature “has already implanted in human 
beings receptivity to the [sympathetic feeling]”(6:456) What is incumbent on us is 
to cultivate this feeling by “not avoiding the places where the poor who lack the 
most basic necessities are to be found but rather to seek them out, and not to shun 
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sickrooms or debtor’s prisons and so forth in order to avoid sharing painful 
feelings one may not able to resist”(6:457) All this implies that Kant’s ethical 
community encourages recognition of suffering, the activity of charity to reduce 
this suffering and gratitude to people who carry out charity. 
Aside from the laws of virtue based on duties of respect and duties of love, 
the members of the ethical community should be endowed with the virtues of 
social intercourse. These are “affability, sociability, courtesy, hospitality, and 
gentleness (in disagreeing without quarreling) “(Ak 6:474) They may be couched 
in the general category of politeness. Kant discusses politeness in his Moral 
Anthropology.  It is Patrick Frierson who gives a succinct account of Kant’s 
discussion of the moral importance of politeness33.  Kant grants that affability, 
sociability, courtesy, hospitality, and gentleness (which go under the general name 
of politeness) are only tokens and illusions of virtue (Ak 6:474) “Yet they promote 
the feeling for virtue itself” (Ak 6:474) According to Frierson, they do this in the 
following way. One of the major human hindrances to morality is deceiving 
oneself that one is simply incapable of self-mastery and virtue. Kant thinks that 
politeness, though it may be a mere appearance, fights against this self-deception 
by showing one that he is indeed capable of self-mastery: 
“In society everyone is well-behaved, [but] everything is appearance, the 
desires of the citizens against each other are there; in acting everyone burns 
with wickedness..., and yet he is as composed and indifferent as if this did 
not stir him at all. Truly this betrays a self-mastery [Selbsbeherrschung] and 
is the beginning of conquering oneself [Selbstbezwingung] It is a step 
towards virtue” (Ak 25:930) 
Politeness shows that one is indeed capable of self-mastery. Additionally, 
according to Kant, politeness inspires love for virtue. When a person appears 
polite, others love him. Seeing that the appearance of virtue inspires love, human 
beings tend to make the appearance real: “one who loves the illusion of the good 
eventually is won over to actually loving the good. One loves those people who 
are always polite to others” (Ak 25:931) We are all affected by examples of virtue.  
Seeing those examples, even though these may be mere appearances, leads one to 
investigate his own virtue.  Christ, for example,” appeals to the way [his 
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followers] would of themselves voluntarily act if they examined themselves 
properly”(Ak 8:338) Learning from the examples of people like Christ is an 
indispensable step to self-examination without which virtue is impossible. 
We are now in a position to answer the question whether Kant's notion of an 
ethical community warrants us to say that the individualistic reading of Kant's 
ethics is an incorrect reading. Can the individualistic reading of Kant's ethics come 
to terms with the notion of the ethical community? I think that it cannot because 
Kant's ethical community is not simply an agreement of isolated and not 
necessarily social individuals on certain laws of virtue. In other words, individuals 
in Kant's ethical community are social beings and the ethical community endows 
them with a collective identity. They share a collective moral end of transforming 
their society so as to become (morally) better individuals. The collective identity 
that arises out of sharing a collective moral end has an impact on their beliefs and 
attitudes. Moral education in the ethical community makes them praise certain 
values (i.e. charity, cooperation) and despise certain other values (i.e. arrogance, 
intellectual servility). Furthermore, their attitude becomes more altruistic. They 
make each other's end their own end. This is exactly how Kant defines friendship34 
and friendship would therefore be a good analogy for the ethical community. Kant 
sometimes goes so far as to liken the ethical community to a family. He says that 
the ethical community  "could best of all be likened to the constitution of a 
household(a family) under a common though invisible moral father, whose holy 
son, who knows the father's will and yet stands in blood relation with all the 
members of the family, takes his father's place by making the other members 
better acquainted with his will; these therefore honor the father in him and thus 
enter into a free, universal and enduring union of hearts"(Ak 6:102) In the analogy 
between the ethical community and the family, we see certain elements that an 
individualistic reading could not account for. What we see is not an agreement of 
isolated individuals on certain principles but rather "a union of hearts”.  
Furthermore, in the ethical community, the moral message is constantly 
disseminated into the ethical community (perhaps through moral education) so as 
to make the members of the ethical community "better acquainted with" moral 
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religion,"the will of the father"(Ak 6:102), and therefore better equipped for moral 
improvement. This also teaches us that the communitarian and the religious 
readings of Kant come together neatly. We have seen that Kant sees the hope for 
the possibility of God's existence and the psychologically compelling effect of 
belief to be morally very important. The ethical community, "a union of hearts" 
under an "invisible moral father"(Ak 6:102), cherishes this hope and psychology. 
This yields the social context in which we can become aware of our absolute 
worth as rational beings and capacity for moral self-legislation and moral 
perfection more easily. Perhaps, Kant had to give us a more detailed account of 
the emotional aspect of the ethical community and the social determinants of 
moral religion. That would give us a more solid ground to see that for Kant moral 
religion is not simply a subjective, optional and private recognition of duties as 
divine commands but a phenomenon deeply rooted in our psychology as social 
beings and our collective (social) aim of moral reform. Still, however, I believe 
that we have good reason to suppose that what Kant had in mind when he 
discussed the notion of an ethical community was essentially different from an 
artificial union of isolated individuals on the basis of certain abstract principles.   
To conclude this chapter, Kant’s ethical community is a union of well-
disposed individuals who recognize their equality as human beings and their 
duties of respect and love to each other and act according to laws based on these 
duties. The obedience to these laws has an emotional and religious aspect to it. 
The ethical community fights the vices of arrogance, defamation, and ridicule and 
promotes charity. It is a community that finds intellectual servility despicable. 
Furthermore, it encourages the norm of politeness to remove the hindrances to 
morality (i.e. self-deception that one is incapable of self-mastery) It is only by 
establishing such a community, human beings can bring about the highest good 
(general happiness combined with virtue)  
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  CHAPTER 5: 
CONCLUSION 
 
         In this thesis, I have argued against a formalist interpretation of Kant's ethics 
and pursued the idea that for Kant, morality aims at happiness and its proper 
distribution. This happiness is collective happiness and the criterion for its proper 
distribution is virtue. Achieving this is also a collective project and this is why I 
have opted for a communitarian reading of Kantian ethics.  For Kant we are social 
beings and when we live in morally corrupt societies, we cannot easily appreciate 
the importance of virtue and discover our capacity for freely choosing a virtuous 
life. An ethical community, on the other hand, motivates us to change our attitudes 
in favor of morality. Kant's ethical community goes beyond a mere agreement on 
certain laws of virtue and appeals to our altruistic feelings (i.e. our need and 
capacity for friendship) and to our hope that God may exist. The possibility of 
God's existence is an idea that we need to be able to promote general happiness 
distributed in proportion to virtue. This, along with the psychologically 
compelling effect of belief, is the reason I choose to interpret Kant's ethics from a 
religious point of view. By grounding an anti-formalist interpretation of Kant's 
ethics on a combination of a communitarian and religious readings, I think that we 
can see how Kant reconciles morality and (general) happiness.  
         I acknowledge that for Kant happiness cannot be the determining ground of 
a morally motivated will because the notion of duty requires a categorical 
command and imperatives based on happiness never command categorically (Ak 
425). They command actions only as means to the promotion of happiness. 
Prudence, meaning the “skill in the choice of means to one’s own greatest well-
being” (Ak 415-6) can never be the foundation of morality. This is most clear 
when we look at Kant’s identification of prudence with “the skillful use of other 
people in the pursuit of one’s own ends” (Ak 8:322-25) Morality, for Kant, 
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prohibits using others merely with the purpose of advancing our own ends.  
In this thesis, one of my arguments has been that the clash between 
happiness and morality is most obvious in a selfish and comparative pursuit of 
happiness. For Kant, our selfish pursuit of happiness is driven by desires that arise 
in social life. This is why I emphasized the social aspect of Kant’s account of 
prudence and happiness. According to Kant, we replace our instinctual drives with 
new drives that arise in social life (Ak 25:585) Some of these new drives are 
innocent. To give a Kantian example for these, most young men do not marry at 
the age when they are physically ready but want to wait for the time when they are 
cultivated enough to court a woman. Some others are not so innocent: lust of 
power, avarice, thirst for vengeance, having influence over others (Ak8:80, 
87,185) The common feature of all these drives is the tendency to compare 
ourselves with others. While pursuing our happiness, we cannot but observe what 
others are like and what they are doing. As prudent individuals, we want to 
conform to others and avoid being perceived as weird and difficult. At the same 
time, however, we want to affirm some sort of superiority over them. We want our 
ideal of happiness to be superior to theirs. This is also a claim to having superior 
worth. Therefore, it is a claim that challenges the principle of morality that we are 
equal in dignity.   
         According to Kant, our selfish pursuit of happiness that goes hand in hand 
with our claim that we are worthier than others can never lead to true contentment. 
Our desires are volatile and are immediately replaced with new ones when they 
are fulfilled. We cannot depend upon any of highly regarded goods such as 
knowledge, health, and wealth. Wealthy people, for example, are always anxious 
that others might be using them. And wise people usually long for the bliss of 
ignorance. Furthermore, we can always find people who are happier than others 
and this can easily make us fall into despair.  
         Kant’s solution to this problem is, as we saw, to do away with the selfishness 
of the pursuit of happiness. Kant’s social conception of prudence has also a moral 
side to it and allows room for an unselfish pursuit of happiness. Because, 
according to another aspect of the social conception of prudence, we need 
toleration of and cooperation from others in pursuing our ends that comprise our 
happiness. Therefore, a moral realm of toleration and cooperation, the kingdom of 
                                                             38 
ends, is conducive to our happiness. We should aim at establishing that happiness 
and taking our portion of it in proportion to our virtue.  The distribution of 
happiness according to virtue is ensured by the wise will of God. In the moral 
realm, with divine assistance, our virtue should determine our “worthiness to be 
happy” (Ak 5:110).  The upshot of all this is that we should give up a selfish 
pursuit of happiness in exchange for our portion of a deserved general happiness.    
         Kant thinks that deserved happiness is a special form of happiness and is of 
superior value than what he calls “happiness as only a contingent and external 
effect dependent on nature”. He expresses this in the following words: 
“Happiness is twofold: either that which is an effect of the free choice of 
rational beings in themselves, or that which is only a contingent and 
external effect dependent on nature. Rational beings can make the true 
happiness, which is independent of everything in nature, for themselves 
through actions that are directed to themselves and reciprocally to each 
other. And without this, further, nature cannot afford genuine happiness. 
This is the happiness of the intelligible world [Verstandeswelt]... I must 
seek on my part to attain the example of perfection in a possible good 
world. That is good in itself, which does not depend merely on contingent 
conditions, but on my own will.”( Ak 19:202-3)  
 
Kant clearly distinguishes happiness of the intelligible world that results from the 
free choice of rational beings from happiness that is merely a gift of nature.  The 
happiness of the intelligible world occurs when we establish reciprocity between 
our ends and the ends of other rational beings so that our ends not only harmonize 
with but also advance the ends of others. This happiness results from moral 
perfection and is therefore good in itself. Furthermore, as the following passage 
clearly conveys, it is dependant on our free will: 
 
“A certain basis(fount, foundation)of satisfaction is necessary, which no one 
must lack, and without which no happiness is possible, the rest are 
accidents...This basis is self-satisfaction(as it were apperceptio iucunda 
primitiva). It must depend neither on the gift of nature nor on luck and 
accident, since these need not accord of themselves with our essential and 
highest ends. Since the satisfaction must be connected with its source 
necessarily and universally, thus a priori and not merely according to 
empirical laws, which are never apodictically certain, it must 1. depend on 
the free will, which we can ourselves make in accordance with the idea of 
the highest good. 2. this freedom must to be sure be independence from all 
sensuous necessitation, but yet not altogether without law”(Ak 19:278)  
 
Setting our happiness on our free will is a way to ward off the contingency and 
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indeterminacy that the selfish pursuit of happiness creates.  That is, by being a free 
(self-legislating) member of the kingdom of ends, we can hope for a determinate 
happiness, which is of great value because it is freely chosen and deserved. That 
kind of happiness partakes in the value of freedom which is “the inner value of the 
world” (Ak 27:1482)  
         Interestingly, to be able to achieve this happiness, one’s primary focus 
should be not on being happy but rather being worthy of happy. This is what Kant 
says when he discusses the appropriate answers to the questions a moral trainee 
must be asked:  
 
“ 5) What does one call the condition in which all the wishes of a human 
being... are satisfied?- I don’t know- Happiness, because everything like that 
rests on luck. 
6) Could you then be happy in the highest degree but yet dissatisfied with 
yourself in the highest degree, and why?[No.] Because you are conscious 
and say to yourself that you are not worthy of this happiness. 
7) Can another who makes you happy also make you worthy of happiness, or 
must it be yourself whose conduct makes you worthy?- I must do it myself. 
8) What then must be the first of all your wishes, to be happy or to be worthy 
of happiness? To be worthy, i.e., to so act that at least I am not unworthy of 
it.-Since you must do it yourself, thus you are free”(Ak 19:312) 
 
If one is happy but finds himself unworthy of this happiness, he cannot enjoy a 
complete self-satisfaction. That is why to be worthy of happiness should be the 
first wish of the moral trainee. 
Still, as I have tried to show throughout my thesis, in a realm where 
everyone aims at being worthy of happiness, general happiness occurs.  In other 
words, although our primary motivation is to be worthy of happiness instead of 
being happy, we still achieve general happiness. This happens because members 
of the moral realm value the freedom of each other and respect each other’s 
capacity to set ends for themselves using their reason. This means that they respect 
each other’s pursuit of happiness. Furthermore, they help each other achieve 
happiness. Help functions according to the principle of reciprocity. A member of 
the kingdom of ends may ask for others’ help because he is willing to offer help 
when others ask for it. Kant discusses this in the following way: 
 
“... a [man], for whom things are going well while he sees that others(whom 
he could very well help) have to contend with great hardships, thinks: what 
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is it to me? Let each be as happy as heaven wills or as he can make himself; 
I shall take nothing from him nor even envy him; only I do not care to 
contribute anything to his welfare or to his assistance in need! Now, if such a 
way of thinking were to become a universal law the human race could 
admittedly very well subsist...but it is still impossible to will that such a 
principle hold everywhere as a law of nature. For, a will that decided this 
would conflict with itself, since many cases could occur in which one would 
need the love and sympathy of others and in which, by such a law of nature 
arisen from his own will, he would rob himself of all hope of the assistance 
he wishes for himself”(Ak 4:424) 
 
 
Here, Kant’s argument is definitely not a prudential argument, which would 
proceed in the following way: “It is in my interest to help others to make them 
more prone to help me when I am in need”. Rather, the argument that Kant favors 
is that “to be rationally consistent in asking for help, I should be ready to help 
others”. The gist of Kant’s argument is best captured when one thinks,” I am not 
worthier than others. Why should getting help be an exclusive right for me?” At 
the bottom of Kant’s argument, we find an idea of equality in terms of intrinsic 
worth- equality in dignity. In the moral realm, thanks to the idea of equality in 
dignity, everyone contributes to each other’s happiness by helping each other in a 
reciprocal manner. This does not mean forfeiting the pursuit of one’s own 
happiness.  Pursuing our own happiness is also a duty since if we are unhappy, we 
are more likely to transgress our duties. Furthermore, as we saw, duty to secure 
other people’s happiness contributes to our own happiness: once we help others, 
we can expect their help in return. This is why it is still wiser to contribute to other 
people’s happiness in cases our happiness would seem to be being compromised 
by helping others. 
The normative foundation of the moral realm is, as we saw, the idea of 
equality in dignity- the idea that we are equal because we all share the rational 
faculties unique to humanity. According to Kant, to be able to appreciate the idea 
of equality in dignity, we need to check our drive to claim superior worth over 
others. As we saw earlier, this drive is most manifest in our selfish pursuit of 
happiness, which is based on comparative self-love. When we form an ideal of 
happiness for ourselves, we always want that ideal to be superior to the ideal of 
others. Kant thinks that such a comparative pursuit of happiness destructs the 
whole foundation of the moral realm, the kingdom of ends.  To be able to bring 
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about a moral realm, therefore, we should cleanse ourselves of self-conceit. 
Kant thinks that we cannot do this in isolation however well disposed we 
may be. We need to unite in an ethical community and acquire a collective 
identity in the ethical community. The ethical community, "a union of hearts" 
fights the grounds of self-conceit by turning us into people who do not find 
distinctions on the basis of wealth, power and status to be the determining ground 
of their worth. These distinctions melt away in the recognition of the fact that we 
are all dignified equals and friends under divine command.  This does not only 
endows us with a collective identity but also has a compelling psychological effect 
on our effort to have a moral disposition. The social context of evil is therefore 
removed in the ethical community. In the ethical community, instead of boasting 
about our distinctions, we cultivate sympathy with others and help them through 
charity. We discover that we are capable of self-mastery by displaying virtues of 
social intercourse (politeness) and take a giant step towards virtue.  Furthermore, 
in the ethical community, we get rid of the intellectual servility that arises when 
clergy or moral teachers monopolize moral knowledge. The idea of equality in 
dignity therefore motivates us to be author of our own morality. And 
consequently, we legislate for ourselves the duties of love and respect. 
The ethical community contributes to the realization of the ideal of the 
highest good (general happiness distributed in proportion to virtue) In other words, 
the exercise of the laws of virtue creates an environment conducive to general 
happiness. First, laws of virtue allow us to make better use of our inclinations and 
be happy. Inclination to social enjoyment, for example, can lead us to happiness 
most reliably when under the guidance of the laws of virtue. Kant gives the 
example of a dinner party composed of men of taste who enjoy the company of 
each other, engage in an open exchange of ideas and do not spread evil report 
about each other(Ak 8:88). This is “civilized bliss” and is preferable to a social 
event characterized by envy, defamation and ridicule. Secondly, in the ethical 
community, we do not develop passions that are destructive of our happiness. As 
we saw, there is no reason to be ambitious about power in the ethical community. 
Cleansing ourselves of passionate ambition is good as far as our happiness is 
concerned. This is because if a person is passionately ambitious, he usually 
ignores whether others hate him for his actions. He, thus, becomes blind to his 
inclination to be liked by others. Consequently, as others do not like him, he 
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becomes unhappy. We avoid this in the ethical community, which does not allow 
the cultivation of passionate ambition. Thirdly, laws of virtue promote toleration 
of and cooperation from others in the pursuit of happiness. Respect and 
beneficence among human beings contribute to general happiness. Finally, the 
ethical community does away with many distinctions (wealth, status, knowledge) 
that prevent most people from partaking in happiness. For example, in the ethical 
community, priests cannot enjoy the exclusive happiness that arises from having 
the monopoly of knowledge. In general, the ethical community is against all 
criteria other than virtue that may govern the distribution of happiness. All this 
clearly establishes that without forming an ethical community, we are incapable of 
discharging the duty to promote the highest good. 
A good way to conclude the thesis would be to state how I see the 
connection between two major Kantian concepts: the good will and the highest 
good.  Kant thinks that we have the duty to have a good will that arises out of pure 
respect for the moral law. A good will is good in itself. It is not good “because of 
what it effects or accomplishes, or because of its fitness to attain some proposed 
end but only because of its volition”(Ak 4:394) Still, a good will pursues the end 
of attaining the highest good- general happiness distributed in proportion to virtue. 
It hopes for divine assistance because only God can ensure that happiness is to be 
distributed according to virtue. In morally corrupt communities, we usually do not 
concentrate on our capacity to have a good will. Therefore, a social context of a 
morally reformed (ethical) community is a great contributor to our effort to have a 
good will. Nevertheless and before all, even when it exists in the midst of moral 
corruption, a good will always keeps shining “like a jewel by its own light”(394:8) 
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